Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1956

Article 5

12-1956

Book Reviews
Robert J. Harris (reviewer)
John Raeburn Green (reviewer)
H. C. Nixon (reviewer)

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert J. Harris (reviewer), John Raeburn Green (reviewer), and H. C. Nixon (reviewer), Book Reviews, 10
Vanderbilt Law Review 161 (1956)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol10/iss1/5

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT. By Bennett B. Patterson. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1955. Pp. ix, 217. $4.00.
This little volume consists of 85 pages of text and 132 pages of appendices. The latter contain the text of the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the First Congress and the debates upon them as
taken from the Annals of Congress. The appendices are not only the
major portion of the volume but also the more valuable. In his essay
Mr. Patterson, who is a member of the Texas Bar, propounds the
theme that the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is an incorporation in the Constitution of "the inherent natural
rights of the individual" which instead of limiting the power of the
national government is a grant of power to it and the imposition of
a duty upon it to protect fundamental human rights. In developing this
theme Mr. Patterson sketches the legislative history of the Bill of
Rights in general and the Ninth Amendment in particular. James
Madison, who was the author of the substance of the Amendment, introduced it in order to overcome the argument against a bill of rights
to the effect that the enumeration of specific rights would disparage
rights that were not enumerated. It is Mr. Patterson's contention that
the rejection by Congress of two of the twelve proposed amendments
and the frustration of Madison's plan to have those adopted inserted
at appropriate places in the original text of the Constitution have
combined to give rise to the proposition that the first ten admendments
limit only the national government. Such a conclusion, the author
urges, is incorrect as applied to the Ninth Amendment which he contends not only limits the state governments but positively empowers
the federal government to protect the inherent natural rights of the
individual person against all governmental action by legislative enactment and judicial decision.
To corroborate this conclusion Mr. Patterson cites a number of
Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate that the Ninth Amendment
has not only not been held to be inapplicable to the state governments,
but that unenumerated rights of the individual have been judicially
recognized under either natural law doctrines or due process of law.
However, he thinks it preferable to have the Ninth Amendment carry
its full burden in order to avoid the confusion arising out of the selective incorporation of the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth
and the neglect of other rights which are not enumerated. Throughout his essay Mr. Patterson is not specific as regards unenumerated
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rights, but he does cite trial by jury (p. 51), prohibition of torturous
punishment (p. 51), proscription of imprisonment for debt (pp. 51-52)
and punishment for witchcraft. Constitutional historians are not
likely to praise Mr. Patterson for the manner in which he develops his
thesis, but many will undoubtedly agree with his assertion that the
federal government has been less of a threat to liberty than the state
governments (p. 42), and the quality of statesmanship in the federal
government has been higher (p. 43). Students of the Constitution
will find it difficult to see relevance to the Ninth Amendment in his
homily on religion (pp. 63-71) or his personal draft of a bill of obligations (pp. 77-81). Indeed, they may conclude as a result of this
essay that it is just as well the Ninth Amendment has been forgotten.
ROBERT J. HARRIS*

THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791. By Robert Allen Rutland.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. Pp. vii,
243. $5.00.

THE BITH OF

This book, a publication of the Institute of Early American History
and Culture (at Williamsburg) is, the author says, an effort to draw
together "the story of how Americans came to rely on legal guarantees
for their personal freedom." Mr. Rutland is a journalist, not a lawyer,
and lawyers will perhaps feel that the book suffers because of that.
Nevertheless they will find it interesting and valuable, though it may
seem incomplete.
The English beginnings of some (not all) of our fundamental rights
-habeas corpus, trial by jury, the rights against excessive finds and
bails, against self-incrimination, against double jeopardy, and others
-are traced. The debt of our Bill of Rights to the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, in a few of these matters, is quite obvious. But some
of them owed rather more to colonial experience and development.
Mr. Rutland, after reviewing the colonial charters and early legislation-notably John Locke's 1669 draft of a charter for Carolina, and
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641) -deals with the Continental Congress' Declaration of Rights (October 14, 1774) and its Letter
to the Inhabitants of Quebec' two weeks later, which contained the
first assertion by any public body that freedom of the press was an
essential element of liberty.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), drawn by George Mason,
is reviewed with the detail which, because of the profound influence
*Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
1. Quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931).
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this immediately began to exert, it deserves. The bills of rights and
constitutions which were then adopted by the states, ending with New
York in 1787, are dealt with more briefly, for they followed the
Virginia pattern, "modified or enlarged to suit local conditions and demands." (The modifications were more substantial than the enlargements.) The bill of rights contained in the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, and the rejection of Mason's proposal for a bill of rights
in the new Federal Constitution, then set the stage for the struggle
over ratification of the Constitution, from which the first ten amendments emerged. Mr. Rutland's treatment of this, state by state, is
thorough. Here again Virginia led the way, ratifying, but recommending the addition of a Bill of Rights. On the basis of that understanding
ratification was in the end obtained. Mr. Rutland concludes that "a
broad base of public opinion forced the adoption of the Bill of Rights
upon those political leaders who knew the value of compromise."
In a final chapter the author discusses the enforcement of the Bill
of Rights by the courts from 1791 to 1955. He observes that Jefferson
did not foresee "complete rejection of the eighteenth-century notion
that government was at best a necessary evil which must be curbed
to safeguard individual freedom," and that "perhaps individual liberty
has become a secondary concern, subordinate to the paramount issue
of safety of the nation." "It is quite likely," Mr. Rutland remarks,
"that the great men of the Revolution would be extremely uncomfortable in such a climate of opinion." To this pessimistic conclusion
such a decision as Dennis v. United States,2 which cut out the heart of
the clear and present danger rule by eliminating its temporal element,
depriving the rule of its vital force, certainly lends support. But the
last word has not been written; one may still hope that in the end
we shall display the courage of our forefathers, and restore its earlier
vigor to the first amendment.
It is probable that no lawyer has examined the Annals of Congress
without regretting that the debate in the First Congress over the
Bill of Rights is there so scantily reported. Mr. Rutland's account is
further abbreviated. There are other substantial omissions in the
book. Our freedom of speech and freedom of the press did not come
from England-we establishe . them first 3- yet Mr. Rutland gives
no hint of any influence by or derivation from Voltaire, Rousseau, the
2. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
3. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1941):
. . to assume
that English common law in this field became ours is to deny the generally
accepted historical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolution was to
get rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of the press.'
"

No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of
securing for the people of the United States much greater freedom of religion,
expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever
enjoyed."
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Encyclopaedists, and the Great Enlightenment. And, while the Supreme Court has on several occasions traced the history of various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, Mr. Rutland makes no reference to
these opinions. If these are faults, they are perhaps the price paid for
attempting to compress into a small and easily readable volume
the history of the twenty-four rights and freedoms, of diverse origins,
and occasionally possessing latent inconsistency with each other, which
the Bill of Rights protects. The book remains a useful and a stimulating one.
JoHN

RAEBURN GREEN*

JAMES WiLsoN: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798. By Charles Page Smith.

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956. Pp. xii, 426.
$7.50.
James Wilson, as a subject of study, has been neglected, in striking
contrast to other founding fathers like Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison. He well deserves this sympathetic biography, which is published
for The Institute of Early American History and Culture of Williamsburg. Wilson surpassed or at least equalled any of his contemporaries
in composite and prophetic outlook. In his own advanced work and
thought, he combined Jefferson's faith in democratic sovereignty,
Madison's balanced constitutionalism, Hamilton's call for national
power, and Marshall's concept of judicial review. He sought to institutionalize energy in the Presidency as if to aid a twentieth-century
Wilson or a Roosevelt. As a capitalistic lawyer he bet too heavily
with borrowed funds on America's expanding economy and brought
his crowded career to a crashing anticlimax in a grand rehearsal for
the panic of 1929. His life was a strenuous one, even in its final failure.
The Smith biography takes James Wilson from birth in a Presbyterian home of the Scotch lowlands through four years as a scholarship student at St. Andrews University, an additional year of theological study, and thenat the age of twenty-three to America for a changed
career with a waning of parental control. The new American soon
tired of tutoring duties in Philadelphia and, with the aid of a relative,
undertook the study of law in the office of John Dickinson, the brilliant "Hamlet of the American Revolution." In due time he became
the leading lawyer of the Quaker City, where he was to hold a law
professorship at the College of Philadelphia. His first lecture was
attended by President Washington, members of Congress, other dignataries and charming ladies. The processes of moot court and moot
legislation were his designs for vitalizing the law for students.
*Member, Green, Hennings, Henry & Evans, St. Louis, Missouri.
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James Wilson quite naturally became active in the government of
his city, state and nation-in-the-making. He became a pamphleteer
of the Revolution. He became a member of the Continental Congress
and signed the Declaration of Independence. As a member of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 he advanced or advocated important
proposals that were adopted and others that were rejected. The biographer pronounces this summer work "the greatest of Wilson's life."
Glimpsing the modern doctrine of dual federalism, the Pennsylvanian
wished to make the national government directly responsible and
responsive to the voters without intermediary or indirect action by
the states in electing President or Senators. With no fears of monarchical tendencies, he fought for a one-man chief executive and
against his election by the national legislature. He preferred majority
rule to minority obstruction, moral criteria of the people to seeking
a balance of power among group interests. He looked for a common
denominator of individual preference that would transcend state lines,
sectionalism and class cleavage. He espoused democracy against the
Tories; he espoused central and executive power against the democrats.
Wilson urged in the convention that the judiciary and executive
acting together have constitutional revisionary power to forestall
statutes that might be unjust, unwise, or dangerous without being "so
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them
effect." As an active member acquainted with the history of jurisprudence, he has been credited with authorship of the clause prohibiting
state laws "impairing the obligations of contracts," which crept into
the Constitution rather anonymously. Professor Smith suspends evidence on the point as neither proved nor disproved. An exponent of
property and democracy and a giant speculator in western lands, Wilson consistently and successfully opposed prohibitive or restrictive
provisions on the admission of new states. He was one of the grand
architects of the Constitution, and he became the chief champion of
the successful movement for its ratification in the crucial state of
Pennsylvania. In the latter contest, an observer called him a "blaze of
fire," and another compared him to a combination of Cicero and
Demosthenes.
The rugged and ambitious Wilson drove his dynamic talents in
many directions, into law, learning, land and love, into private
and public affairs. His manifold career can be covered only with a high
degree"of sketchy selectivity by a one-volume study. In spite of a stiffness and reserve of personality, he possessed intellectual confidence
as a master of law, which he designated a "historical science." With
the Constitution in force and George Washington becoming President,
Wilson recommended himself outright by letter to Washington for
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appointment as Chief Justice, only to see the office go to John Jay,
later to John Rutledge, and then to Oliver Ellsworth. He had to be
contented or discontented with an Associate Justiceship, perhaps missing the first prize because of his extensive financial involvements and
the expansion of his financial ventures after not having received the
coveted appointment. In the words of the biographer, there was "a vein
of impracticality in Wilson's nature." Besides Court duties and business activities, he launched an undertaking to codify the state and
colonial laws of Pennsylvania with annotations from common law.
Making headway with this, he vainly sought a similar or approximate
assignment with the national government. And Justice Wilson had for
a time his law teaching, with formal lectures that would be preserved
and provide more biographical grist than his service on the bench.
Wilson's performance as Associate Justice was consistent, if not
impressive in days when the Supreme Court was not impressive. In
riding his circuit, he was one of the Justices who militantly refused
to comply with congressional legislation requiring them to perform
non-judicial administrative functions in processing papers for veterans' pensions. Not being a judicial proceeding, this set no precedent,
but it provided a hint of the future role of the Court in passing on
the constitutionality of federal statutes. Wilson wrote a strong opinion
on national sovereignty and the role of the Supreme Court in Chisholm
v. Georgia,' the provocative case which brought forth the eleventh
amendment. Overwhelmed with misfortune, he became a virtual
fugitive from the nation's capital to avoid Pennsylvania imprisonment
for debt. Racked with fever in his body and feverish schemes in his
head while on circuit, he died in Horniblow Tavern, Edenton, North
Carolina, in 1798.
Professor Smith has looked at the making and flowering of the mind
of James Wilson, taking account of the broad social and intellectual
currents of the times. Except for brevity of treatment, his work might
be classed with Beveridge's Marshall as an eloquent tribute to its man,
a tribute bordering on hero-worship, Is it favorable or unfavorable
comment to observe that the Smith study gives more space and analysis to Wilson as law teacher than to Wilson as Associate Justice?
H. C. NInoN*
1. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
*Visiting Professor of History, Whittier College.

